DOI: https://doi.org/10.20529/IJME.2014.023
A recent statement commissioned by the Indian Association of Private Psychiatry recommends that unmodified electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) should still be used in some settings in India, invoking the principle of beneficence. This paper critically analyses the IAPP statement in terms of both scientific accuracy and ethical principles. It is found that the statement falls short of the ethical principles of beneficence, non-maleficence and justice. It is the duty of psychiatrists and psychiatric associations to offer the best available care to their patients, both on scientific and ethical grounds.
In 2012, a paper entitled “Position statement and guidelines on unmodified electroconvulsive therapy” was published in the April issue of the Indian Journal of Psychiatry(1). This statement (henceforth referred to as “the IAPP statement”) was commissioned by the Indian Association of Private Psychiatry (IAPP), and was also endorsed by the Indian Association of Biological Psychiatry and the Indian Psychiatric Society (IPS). The latter endorsement is of significance because the IPS is the largest professional body representing psychiatrists in India, and one of its stated objectives is to “promote ethical standards in the practice of psychiatry in India” (2).
The timing of this document was crucial because it closely followed the preparation of the draft version of the Mental Health Care Bill, which banned the practice of unmodified electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) regardless of the circumstances. In opposition to this, the IAPP statement provided a seemingly far-reaching and systematic review of the medical literature pertaining to the practice of unmodified ECT, and concluded that the practice should be continued, both in emergency and non-emergency situations, provided certain criteria were fulfilled (1).
The topic of ECT, and unmodified ECT in particular, has always evoked controversy and strong responses from both its detractors and supporters (3, 4, 5). On the face of it, the IAPP statement frames the issue in the form of an ethical conflict, pitting two principal tenets of medical ethics against each other: beneficence and non-maleficence. Its position can be summarised as follows.
It would seem that the IAPP statement represents a fair and balanced resolution of an ethical dilemma, weighed and analysed in the light of the best scientific evidence. However, this paper will demonstrate that this is not so, and that the IAPP statement’s proposal to liberalise the use of unmodified ECT violates not one, but three significant principles of medical ethics.
Before proceeding, however, a historical overview of ECT and the controversies surrounding it is in order.
ECT is not a new treatment in psychiatry, having been practised for over 75 years (9). Though its exact mechanisms of action remain unclear, it involves the induction of a brief seizure by the passage of a direct electric current through the brain. Electric stimulation which is too low to cause a seizure (“sub-shock” or “sub-threshold” stimulation) has no therapeutic effect (10).
ECT is effective in the management of several major mental disorders, including severe depression, mania, acute psychosis, schizophrenia, and catatonia (10, 11). It is also effective in treating neuroleptic malignant syndrome, which is a life-threatening side-effect of antipsychotic drugs (10, 11). Though interest in ECT has waned to some extent with the advent of other forms of treatment, particularly medication (12), there is still much active research in the area, particularly in optimising the delivery of treatment and patient outcomes (12, 13). Among patients with severe depression, ECT can rapidly reduce the risk of suicide in the short term (14), giving the modality an advantage over antidepressants, which often take weeks to manifest a response.
Initially, ECT was administered in an “unmodified” or “direct” form, which was associated with a significant risk of muscle and bone injuries. This led to the development of modified ECT, in which a patient is given brief general anaesthesia and a short-acting muscle relaxant before the induction of the seizure. With the advent of modified ECT, the unmodified form was gradually phased out, though it is still practised in some parts of the developing world due to economic constraints and lack of proper training (7, 15, 16, 17). International guidelines on ECT clearly state that the modified form, and not the unmodified one, is to be administered to all patients. The World Health Organization condemns the practice of unmodified ECT (18), something which even the IAPP statement acknowledges (1). In a review specifically addressing the concerns of developing countries, representatives of the World Psychiatric Association have also opposed this practice, stating that the provision of modified ECT “is an ethical obligation on the parts of governments, professional organizations and individual practitioners” (19).
There are at least four reasons to support the practice of modified ECT, three of which are directly related to the key principles of medical ethics.
First, there is the question of efficacy. Psychiatry, like most branches of medicine, has moved towards evidence-based practice, in which evidence from well-designed controlled trials is used to guide treatment. These evidence-based reviews are overwhelmingly based on the results of trials which have used modified ECT (20, 21, 22). Thus, when extrapolating from them to clinical practice, the same form of treatment, namely modified ECT, would have to be administered to ensure efficacy, as per evidence-based principles which dictate that clinical treatments must be based on good-quality clinical trials. Though the initial evidence regarding the efficacy of ECT did come from reports on unmodified ECT, the current recommendations and guidelines are based on more recent evidence gathered from the use of modified ECT. This would relate to the principle of beneficence, ie patients should be given those treatments with the best evidence of effectiveness.
The second argument concerns the reason why unmodified ECT was discontinued in the first place, ie the risk of physical injuries, including fractures. This risk is markedly attenuated by the use of modified ECT (10). Though some recent publications have claimed that this risk may have been overstated (6, 7, 8, 23), I have shown below that these results cannot be taken at face value. If this is so, then the principle of non-maleficence would also apply (a treatment that poses a higher risk of harm should be avoided as far as is possible).
The third argument, which is an extension of the first two, concerns the principle of justice. The mentally ill are already an underserved population in most parts of the world, including India (24). This being the case, the onus is on the medical profession to provide, and advocate for, those treatments that are supported by the best evidence and entail the least risk of harm. Failure to do so would constitute an injustice against patients with serious mental illnesses. In the last section of this paper, I have shown that the neglect of this issue is the principal flaw of the IAPP statement and the arguments used to defend its position.
Finally, a case for modified ECT can be made on the grounds of aesthetics and acceptance by the patient. Unmodified ECT is visually unappealing, and this contributes to the negative portrayal of ECT in the media and popular culture (5, 25). As Andrade (5) points out, aesthetic appeal alone cannot be a criterion for choosing a particular treatment, as few medical procedures, particularly surgeries, are aesthetically pleasing. Despite this, the argument is not without value, as the use of modified ECT could help address misconceptions and negative attitudes regarding this form of treatment (25), and increase the patients’ level of acceptance of ECT.
In 1993, Andrade et al (26) published a landmark paper in the Indian Journal of Psychiatry that surveyed the practices followed by Indian psychiatrists when administering ECT. The authors noted, with disapproval, that a sizeable proportion of the psychiatrists expressed a preference for unmodified ECT, and were of the opinion that this was a suboptimal practice which had to be replaced by modified ECT in the course of time.
This was soon followed by the publication of Tharyan et al’s paper (23), which claimed, on the basis of 10 years of experience, that unmodified ECT was associated with a rate of skeletal complications that was as low as below 1%. This data was derived from patients treated between 1980 and 1990, when unmodified ECT was being practised routinely in India. The authors concluded that, in the absence of trained anaesthetic personnel, the use of unmodified ECT by a trained team was safe and acceptable. They also criticised any move, as in Andrade’s paper (26), to recommend modified ECT in “developing countries.”
A reply to Tharyan’s paper, by Gangadhar and Janakiramaiah (27), offered two valuable criticisms of the original article:
Thus, Gangadhar and Janakiramaiah invoke all three principles alluded to above. They point out that there is insufficient evidence to make clear decisions on either beneficence or non-maleficence, and invoke the principle of justice when stating that mental health professionals should advocate for their patients, and not for potentially inferior forms of treatment.
As a curious footnote to this first debate, it must be noted that Andrade also published a critique of the Tharyan et al paper (28), in which he highlighted two further issues: the safety concern with regard to silent, “subclinical” spinal fractures, and the questionable clinical significance of the adverse events reported among their patients who had received modified ECT.
The second discussion regarding unmodified ECT took place in the pages of Issues in Medical Ethics, in the wake of a public petition from a non-governmental organisation, Saarthak, which sought to curtail the use of ECT in India. In particular, the petition sought a ban on the practice of unmodified ECT, which it considered unethical. In response to this, Andrade (3) made a cautious retreat from his previous position, suggesting that unmodified ECT still had a place in India for various reasons, including the high cost of modified ECT and the dearth of trained anaesthesia personnel. This drew a strong reply from the Centre for Advocacy in Mental Health (4), and the original author (5), in turn, replied to clarify his position. In this second paper, the following arguments were offered for the continuation of unmodified ECT.
These arguments are addressed in the next section of this paper.
The paper most cited in support of unmodified ECT, because of the large numbers involved, is the 1993 study of Tharyan et al (23) The earlier critiques of this paper on scientific and ethical grounds (4, 27, 28) have been reviewed above. An additional point which is pertinent, also raised by Waikar et al (4), is that the “trained team” used to restrain the patient during the seizure consisted of four orderlies, three nurses and two postgraduate psychiatry trainees. While this may represent an economic advantage over the use of an anaesthetist, it is doubtful if trained manpower on this scale could be ensured in a small town or a private clinic.
A detailed search of the MEDLINE database for articles on unmodified ECT, published between 1993 and the current date, yielded only four studies of possible relevance. These will be considered individually. Several other papers, which consisted mainly of survey data or patient chart reviews (15, 16, 17), are not reviewed here as no useful conclusions can be drawn from them due to their study design.
These results, taken by themselves, hardly justify the IAPP statement’s advocacy of unmodified ECT. All four studies have serious methodological limitations. The most important of these are the small sample sizes and the absence of a control group, which prevents any valid comparison with modified ECT. Moreover, some of these studies suffer from serious ethical flaws, as described below.
Though the survey- and chart-based data are not reviewed in detail here, it may be noted that they are subject to the same caveats. Therefore, contrary to the position taken in the IAPP statement, there is insufficient scientific evidence to state that unmodified ECT is both safe and effective.
Besides the evident problems with the evidence base that the statement rests upon, there are difficulties with the document itself. These are as follows.
If one weighs the evidence carefully, one finds that the picture regarding unmodified ECT is not as clear as the IAPP statement claims, both with regard to beneficence (effectiveness) and non-maleficence (safety). Despite the statement’s attempt to provide a balanced overview, there are omissions and distortions in key areas that undermine its validity.
Moreover, in an age in which cutting-edge research on modified ECT and other modes of brain stimulation is being conducted even in government hospitals in India (32, 33), why should professional bodies continue to insist on a treatment that is suboptimal? Instead of advocating unmodified ECT, why does the IPS, which openly states its commitment to “promote ethical standards in the practice of psychiatry in India,” not work towards greater collaboration with anaesthetists, the setting up of modified ECT facilities in rural and semi-urban areas, or the training of psychiatrists in basic anaesthesia and life support skills? The failure to do so amounts to injustice, which is a violation of another basic ethical principle. The IAPP statement does not deal fairly with the mentally ill on any of the three grounds of beneficence, non-maleficence and justice, and its harmful consequences are likely to outweigh any benefits in the long run. The words of Gangadhar and Janakiramaiah, though written 19 years ago, are still relevant: “We owe it to our patients to advocate and strive to offer them the best current standards of care, including modified ECT.”